Unpacking race, party and class from below: surveying citizenship in the Msunduzi Municipality by Piper, Laurence & Africa, Cherrel
Piper, L. & Africa, C. (2012). Unpacking race, party and class from below: Surveying citizenship 
in the Msunduzi municipality. GEOFORUM, 43: 219:229 
 
 
University of the Western Cape Research Repository                       lpiper@uwc.ac.za   
 
Unpacking race, party and class from below: 
Surveying citizenship in the Msunduzi municipality 
 
Laurence Piper, Cherrel Africa 
 
Abstract 
On the basis of a 2008 survey conducted in the Msunduzi municipality in the 
KwaZulu-Natal province, the paper begins an exploration of the character of 
popular politics and citizenship in South Africa. Embracing a 'citizen-centred' 
methodology informed by participation literatures, and sensibilities to the 'work in 
progress' character of African cities from urban studies debates, the paper 
interrogates the mainstream liberal-participatory model of citizenship in South 
Africa, and the critiques of current South African politics informed by these notions, 
specifically the 'racial census' and 'dominant party syndrome' analyses. Taken 
together these views can be read as characterising South African politics as a game for 
individual citizens governed by liberal rules, but played by racial and/or partisan 
groups in exclusionary ways, thus distorting liberal democratic mechanisms of 
representation and accountability. The paper also examines evidence for an 
alternative class-based analysis of one aspect of citizenship, namely, protest against 
poor local governance. 
 
 
The paper looks to unpack this 'liberal model versus racialised communitarian 
practice' imaginary by, on the one hand, demonstrating the ways in which citizenship is 
not racialised, or is asymmetrically racialised. Indeed, other than party allegiances and 
trust in key offices, very little by way of what citizens do, believe or think of 
themselves follows discrete racial lines. Similar points hold for partisanship too. On 
the other hand, the paper does not redeem the liberal-democratic model as there is 
also evidence of trust in government when it is not deserved based on performance, 
but more importantly, evidence that citizens embrace 'informal' means to secure their 
rights. A good example of this is protestors who are also more likely to vote than non- 
protestors. Taken together, these findings affirm both the way in which the racial and 
partisan legacy of the past is being undone by new institutions and practices, and 
suggest the com¬plex intersection of these with networks of personal relations which 
characterise the local politics of most African cities. 
 
1. Introduction 
Over the past 10 years in South Africa the number of public protests against poor 
local governance has risen dramatically (Karamoko, 2011: p. 6). Further, protests 
have increased despite the introduction of 'invited spaces' (Cornwall, 2002) for 
communities to engage local government since 2000. Consisting of ward committees, 
and forums for public consultation around the annual budget and development 
planning (Barichievy et al., 2005), these spaces are poorly implemented and 
ineffective at best, or captured for some other politics at worst (Piper and Deacon, 
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2009; Piper and Nadvi, 2010). Just as remarkable as the growing level of local protest is 
that fact that electoral support for the ruling party in almost all the areas where 
protest occurs has remained minimally affected. Thus African National Congress 
(ANC) support has dropped only in the last two elections (one national, one local), 
and only by a few percent (Southall and Daniel, 2009; Booysen, forthcoming). 
 
The fact that the ANC - and the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) for that matter - 
continue to do so well at the polls despite popular dissatisfaction with local 
governance has led many to argue that racial or party loyalty trumps assessments of 
interests for voters. Hence the recent 2011 local government elections saw some 
commentators interpreting the results as the triumph of 'identity politics' over the 
interests of voters in good service delivery (Mangcu, 2011). This argument is a 
reincarnation of the idea of elections as a 'racial census' first mooted by Johnson and 
Schlemmer (1996). Since then, the debate on the significance of identity for voter 
choice has moved on substantially (Mattes, 2005; Lodge, 1999; Reynolds, 1999), and 
most scholars of South African politics do not see voting for, and protesting against, 
ANC local governments as necessarily contradictory. For example, Booysen (2007) 
articulates the combination of 'ballot and brick' as a rational strategy by voters to 
maximise their interests rather than just register a racial identity. According to 
Booysen (2007: p. 31) the reason for this is that, 'in the service-delivery stakes, they 
still trust the ANC more than other political parties and they reckon that they have a 
better chance to hold the ANC accountable through protest, if and when necessary'. 
Notably, even in this account the appeal to trust leaves open the possibility that 
identity may influence choice, albeit party rather than racial identity. This sentiment 
is well captured by Tapscott (2011) who states that 'in South Africa most people 
support political parties like they support their sports teams. When the team does 
badly they may want to change the coach and players, but they would not dream of 
supporting another team'. 
 
Despite this more nuanced analysis of representation and accountability in South 
African politics as not just about race but perhaps about party-linked forms of 
identification, the notion of 'voter loyalty' remains powerful in mainstream political 
science discourse, and is explicitly linked to many of the problems of poor governance 
commonly observed in the media. This is because a basic tenet of the liberal democratic 
model is that democracy is about choosing leaders to represent popular interests in 
the decision-making process. This has its most famous articulation in the works of 
Joseph Schumpeter (1942) and was further developed by Dahl (1971,1998), and is now 
operationalised globally into various indices of democracy and democratisation. In 
South Africa, the argument runs, accountability is severely undermined because voter 
loyalty means that the vote is not used for its intended purpose, but rather to reflect 
'team' identification. 
 
Voter loyalty is widely seen as further endangering democracy in South Africa as it 
maintains the electoral dominance of the ruling party, the ANC, regardless of its 
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performance, thus producing a de facto one-party system (see Butler, 2009). The 
claim is that this enduring dominance is leading to a 'dominant party syndrome' 
where the party starts to assume that it alone is entitled to govern, and treats the state as 
an extension of its own identity, making it more inclined to respond to the logics of 
intra-party dynamics rather than the people it serves. Over time, it is held, the ruling 
party will become more complacent and self-serving, and even authoritarian in 
reacting to the legitimate demands of its citizens. Of late the ANC certainly does seem 
vulnerable to forms of neopatrimonial politics with factions or networks within the 
party at all levels looking to plunder state resources for their own private rather than 
public ends. 
 
In this regard, it is noteworthy that this approach resonates with received Western 
opinion about politics more widely in Africa which is characterised as in some way 
perverse (Meredith, 2006). Against the ideal-typical modernist construction of state 
and democracy in formal and depersonalised terms is rallied the stereotype of African 
politics as authoritarian rule and personalised patron-client relationships, usually 
underwritten by some shared ethnic, family or kin identity, with associated moral 
economy. In the South African case, the significance of voter loyalty, linked to some 
form of racial and/or party identity politics, is reinforced by the history of the 
racialisation of power under the systems of segregation and apartheid, the effects of 
which are still very much evident to this day. Indeed, the undoing of apartheid has 
taken a shape nicely summarised by Seekings and Nattrass (2006) when they state 
that in South Africa wealth, but not poverty, has been deracialised. 
 
This asymmetrical undoing of apartheid's race/class hierarchy links to a more recent 
set of class-related analyses of popular protest. Thus Peter Alexander (2010: p. 37) 
argues that protest can be seen as a 'rebellion of the poor' principally about 
inadequate service delivery and lack  of accountability by local  government 
councillors. Holdt et al. (2011: p. 24) argue that protests are best understood as forms of 
'insurgent citizenship' due to rapid processes of class formation which are 'generating 
fierce struggles over inclusion and exclusion both within the elite, between elites and 
subalterns, and within the subaltern classes themselves'. In the turn to race or class 
respectively to explain key aspects of citizenship in South Africa, there is something of 
earlier debates about the nature of the apartheid, although notably Van Holdt et al. 
do look to move the debate forward by linking class struggle to issues of citizenship. 
Thus, writing in respect of the protests they state (2011: p. 24): 
 
While the processes of class formation are producing what Holston (2008: pp. 7-9) 
calls 'differentiated citizenship'—which  distributes treatment,  rights  and  privileges  
differentially among formally equal citizens according to differences of education, 
property, race, gender and occupation—subaltern groups respond by mobilising an 
'insurgent citizenship' around claims that 'destabilise the differentiated'. 
 
In sum then, the paradox of 'ballot and brick' in local governance in South Africa has 
prompted analysis from the Political Science mainstream which has tended to affirm 
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ideas  of  'voter  loyalty'  linked  to  notions  of  enduring  racial  identity  and/or  party 
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popularity, with some recent alternative accounts of protest that look to class-related 
forms of analysis linked to competing conceptions of citizenship. In what follows in 
this paper, and in the spirit of Benit-Gbaffou and Matlala, also in this journal, we will 
look to interrogate these views with evidence of popular views of citizenship drawn 
from a survey of three wards in the Msunduzi municipality in KwaZulu-Natal. 
 
As it transpires the survey evidence suggests that appeals to concepts of race, party and 
class are only of partial use in understanding citizenship in South Africa, especially at 
the level of urban politics, and that we need to direct our inquiries in new ways, perhaps 
informed by experiences of urban governance elsewhere in Africa. In making this case, 
the following section outlines what is meant by citizenship, especially in the formal 
design of the political system in South Africa. The paper then relates this formal ideal 
to the various accounts of actual political practice, and what would count as evidence 
for these different views, and then briefly outlines the case- study site and the 
methodology before presenting the findings. 
 
2. Unpacking the liberal-participatory model of citizenship 
in South Africa 
The intention of this paper is to bring mainstream views about politics and 
citizenship South Africa into collision with insights from two sets of literature. The 
first, drawn from work on popular agency, mobilisation and public participation in 
the Citizenship Development Research Centre (CDRC), affirms the value of a citizen- 
centric view of politics as opposed to the normal institutional and indeed state-centric 
view of the Political Science mainstream. In this spirit, the paper explores South 
African politics through citizens’' eyes. Notably, the intention is to interrogate both 
the liberal-participatory model of citizenship encoded in South African law and 
policy, and the analysis of various 'communitarian pathologies' in light of the lived 
experience of citizenship. This approach reveals the limited utility of race and/or 
party to understanding citizenship in South Africa, not least as the basic patterns of 
what people do, believe and feel about themselves in respect of public authority are 
either commonly practiced across all groups, or asymmetrically racialised such that 
one group stands out from the norm. Indeed, race and party apply most usefully to 
electoral politics only. Thus, once we broaden the view of South African politics from 
voting to citizenship the significance of race and party-based explanations recedes. 
 
The second set of literature on urban studies in African cities (Robinson, 2006a, 
2006b; Simone, 2001, 2004a, 2004b) opens up a sensibility to the importance of the 
forms of politics perceived as antithetic to the liberal-participatory mainstream 
model, including forms of clientelism and corruption, but also forms of  politics 
outside of the liberal-participatory imaginary that emerge in the context of weak or 
failed governance which Simone (2004a) terms constructing 'people as 
infrastructure', including ongoing practices of  information gathering, network- 
building, competency performance and related forms of 'crisis-management' in 
unstable and risky inner city environments. An indication of the importance of this 
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approach is revealed in our survey by the fact that although those who protest are 
neither White nor especially poor, and are more likely to vote and to participate in 
'invited spaces' of local governance than non-protestors. This raises questions over 
whether these citizens are in fact not some form of insiders linked to power through 
some clientelistic network rather than members of the most marginalised groups. 
 
First, though, we ought to define citizenship. As Barnett and Scott (2007: p. 291) 
note, citizenship can be understood in a thin sense as about legal status conferred by 
membership of a state, or in a thicker sense as also about the various practices 
citizens engage in with respect to public authority. It is the latter meaning of 
citizenship that is fore grounded in this paper, although clearly the lived experience of 
citizenship in South Africa, as in most places, will include reference to the legal 
entitlements and obligations of citizenship too. Furthermore, this paper is interested 
in interrogating the imaginary of liberal-participatory democratic citizenship encoded 
in the Constitution, law and policy, including the design of local governance, and how 
this relates to the lived experience of citizens in the Msunduzi case. As Gaventa and 
Tandon (2010) note, citizenship in a globalising world is becoming more complex as 
political authority shifts away from the state to forms of partnership between state 
and private companies, and upwards to post-national political processes. 
Nevertheless, for the purposes of this study we shall focus on citizenship in respect of 
the South African state and, as operationalised below, this includes relationships of 
four kinds with government, political society, civil society and communities or fellow 
citizens. 
 
In unpacking the idea of citizenship formally encoded by the South African state, the 
obvious place to start is with the South African Constitution of 1996. Often described as 
'one of the best in the world', the South African Constitution is a quintessential 
liberal and pluralist document. Hence, Chapter Two, the Bill of Rights  includes political 
rights like the right to vote, to stand for office, to form political parties; civil liberties 
like the rights of property, equality, religion, speech and academic freedom; socio-
economic rights like the right to food, water, shelter as well as children's rights and 
certain environmental rights. Notably the socio-economic rights are all limited by the 
qualifier that the state must take 'reasonable legislative and other measures, within 
its resources, to achieve the progressive realisation of each of these rights' 
(Constitution, 1996). In addition to affirming classic individual rights,  the 
Constitution also affirms certain group and language rights, but like the socio- 
economic rights in relation to political and civil liberties, they are framed less 
compellingly than individual rights. 
 
Further to the affirmation of individual and group rights the Constitution also 
outlines a system of multi-party, proportionally representative electoral democracy 
with various checks and balances typical of the a liberal model, including an 
independent judiciary, a free press and a (weak) division of powers between executive 
and legislature. The Constitution also establishes various so-called 'Chapter Nine' 
institutions like the Independent Electoral Commission, the Public Protector and the 
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Auditor General amongst others to act as potential counter-veiling forces to the abuse of 
power by government. Furthermore the Constitution establishes three spheres of 
government at national, provincial and local level, each with a degree of autonomy in 
that they each have certain legislative and executive functions, although the degree of 
devolution of power to provinces is slight, and most limited to implementation on key 
policy areas of education and health; devolution to the local sphere is not much 
greater. A small caveat here is that the quality of implementation of policy varies 
tremendously across the country and provinces such that in many ways policy is 
made in implementation, thus affirming the importance of the provincial and local in 
practice. In principle then, the pluralist conceptions of democracy are affirmed in 
providing regionally-specific opportunities for representation. 
 
Notably, in respect of local government the Constitution makes provision for what are 
arguably 'more democratic' forms of political institution. Hence the electoral system 
of local government is 50% constituency-based and 50% the proportional 
representation party lists system at national and provincial level. Half of the 
councillors in any municipality are elected as individuals who contest a local area of 
the municipality, called a ward. The other half are selected by the party and the party is 
allocated a percentage of seats in proportion to the percentage of votes it secures in the 
local government election. The idea behind this approach is to make local government 
more accessible to communities and also more accountable (Booysen, forthcoming). 
This is because international experience has shown that while proportional 
representational systems are good for including all social groups equitably, which is 
important in deeply divided societies like South Africa, they are not good at 
accountability as politicians report to their parties not the people. Conversely, 
constituency-based systems tend to disproportionately reflect the popular choice of 
parties, but offer greater opportunities to keep politicians accountable as they are 
directly elected by constituencies not by parties, and must usually live in the area they 
represent (Mozaffar et al., 2003). 
 
In addition to the above, local government in South Africa is meant to include forms 
of public participation largely absent from national and provincial government. Thus, 
Section 152 of the Constitution includes among the objectives of local government 
(1)(a) 'to provide democratic and accountable government for local communities' and 
(1)(e) 'to encourage the involvement of communities and community organisations in 
the matters of local government'. The Municipal Systems Act 32 of 2000 requires 
municipalities to complement their structures of representative government with a 
system of 'participatory governance'. As argued by Barichievy et al. (2005), there are 
three substantive aspects to the innovation of 'participatory governance'. First, in the 
Municipal Systems Act of 2000, the local community is included alongside 
councillors and administrators in the legal definition of a municipality, a move of 
great symbolic significance. Second, included are requirements for public involvement 
in municipal decision-making processes like the annual budget, the development plan 
review process, the performance management system, service delivery contracting 
and all by-laws.  Last are ward committees.  The Municipal 
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Structures Act provides for ward committees to be established in each ward of a 
metropolitan municipality, city or town. Chaired by the ward councillor, ward 
committees are intended to consist of up to 10 people representing 'a diversity of 
interests' in the ward, with women 'equitably represented'. In respect of their role, 
ward committees are mostly advisory bodies to ward councillors but may enjoy 
greater powers if the council sees fit. 
 
In summary then, the law and policy frame citizenship in South Africa in fairly typical 
liberal ways, but also supplemented with forms of participation at the local level. In 
this model, the typical South African citizen is someone who would look to advance 
their interests by participating in four domains governed by quite specific liberal- 
democratic rules: government, which would include voting in elections and 
participating in the invited spaces of local government; political society, which would 
include participating in political parties and their campaigns; civil society, which 
would include participating in various civil society formations and their activities; 
and the public realm, which would include engaging in public debates through the 
media or other forums. 
 
In what follows we explore popular attitudes towards the key aspects of citizenship 
noted above: (i) what people do in respect of the four forms of political authority, (ii) 
how they feel about political authority, and (iii) how they imagine themselves in 
respect of this political authority. If the 'racial census' view of South African politics is 
correct then we would expect to find citizenship heavily racialised - both in the sense 
that citizen see themselves and politics in racial terms, and in the sense that 
differences in practices and attitudes take racial lines. The evidence allows us to 
explore popular attitudes towards political parties, and especially the assumption 
about the popularity of the ruling party in terms other than votes. Lastly, the evidence 
allows us to explore whether protestors are indeed limited to those from historically 
poor community black communities who have not been as upwardly mobile as their 
former neighbours. In sum, by exploring citizenship from below we open up the 
possibility of interrogating some key framings of South Africans politics. 
 
3. Section two: the survey in Msunduzi 
The survey was conducted in 2008 in the municipality of Msunduzi in KwaZulu-Natal 
as part of the New Forms of Citizenship Project run out of the African Centre for 
Citizenship and for Democracy (ACCEDE) in the School of Government at the 
University of the Western Cape (UWC)1. The case-study site and methodology and 
outlined briefly in this section. 
 
3.1 Msunduzi: the context 
The Msunduzi municipality (KZ225) includes the city of Pietermaritzburg, which is 
the capital of the province of KwaZulu-Natal (see Fig. 1). The second largest 
municipality in the province after the eThekwini metro, Msunduzi covers an area of 
 
1 See http://www.drc-citizenship.org/. 
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approximately 649 square kilometres and with a population in excess of 500,000 
inhabitants. There are 37 wards. For a description of the wards and the local names, 
see Fig. 2. 
 
 
Fig. 1. The Msunduzi municipality (KZ225) in KwaZulu-Natal. Source: National 
Demarcation Board (see http://www.demarcation.org.za/pages/default_new.html. 
Accessed 16 June 2011.) 
 
In terms of demographics Msunduzi closely reflects the province. Nearly 80% of the 
population are black African, and the vast majority of these (over 90%) are isiZulu- 
speaking. Indian South Africans constitute the second largest group at around 12%. 
White South Africans constitute some 8% and coloured South Africans around 3%. In 
economic terms, it is also clear that Msunduzi is, on the whole, not a wealthy city. The 
median income level is to be found in-between the 'poor' and the 'low' category, which in 
the 2001 census data cited by the Demarcation Board lies between the R6000 
(US$860) and R50 000 (US$7 150) per annum2. In terms of political life, Msunduzi 
is a longstanding ANC city, with the party winning some 60% of the vote in the 2006 
local government elections to the Inkatha Freedom Party's (IFP) 17% and the 
Democratic Alliance's (DA) 15%. Moreover, if one looks at the distribution of party 
support as illustrated in Fig. 2, it is clear that ANC support is found in the traditional 
black townships - urban areas historically located some way out of the city - and 
 
2 At the time of the survey the US$/Rand exchange rate was approximately R7 to 1US$. 
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distinct from the more rural wards where IFP supporters live, and the historically 
White and Indian areas close to the heart of the city. 
 
In respect of governance, Msunduzi is formally recognised as a Category B 
municipality (a local town or city as opposed to a metropolitan area),  but  with aspirant 
metropolitan status. The annual budget of Msunduzi is in the region of R1.9 billion 
and the municipality spends about just less than R40 million on salaries. 
Unfortunately the quality of governance in the city has suffered since 2006 due to 
ANC factionalism and the rapid change of officials, although corruption and 
incompetence also contribute to instability in office. In 2010 the municipality failed to 
account for R150 million, a fact officials did their best to keep out the public eye. In 
response the Provincial Executive Committee (PEC) of the ANC fired the senior 
political leadership of the city, and appointed an administrator to root out corruption 
amongst senior officials (The Witness 29/03/2010), only to allow the reinstatement 
of most of the same politicians after the ANC did even better in the 2011 Local 
Government Elections (The Citizen 03/06/2011). In the end the city has had to write 
off a bad debt of some R400 million (anonymous: pers com). In short Msunduzi is a 
good example of a municipality where the ANC has been returned to office despite 
mismanaging municipal governance. 
 
3.2 The survey: methodology and implementation 
 
The surveys were conducted in late 2008 using the same instrument and 
methodology. Based on the Afrobaromoter instrument, which has been extensively 
tested across a number of countries, the instrument was amended slightly to include 
questions of the 'invited spaces' of participatory local governance, specifically ward 
committees, School Governing Bodies (SGBs) and Community Policing Forums (CPFs), 
as well as incorporating questions on the 'invented spaces' created by civil society and 
communities, and some social capital measures. Methodologically the intention was 
to randomly sample 200 households in each of the three selected wards. While 
these wards are typical of different parts of the city they are not a complete 
microcosm of Msunduzi. In addition, they provide enough of a sample across the 
major communities or populations (emic and etic categories) that comprise the city. The 
main idea behind this sampling was to test for key differences in the understanding 
and practice of citizenship across the major social divides of race, class, age, gender 
and language, but also to look for ward-level variance. 
 
We managed to secure the following numbers of respondents in each ward: Ward 26, 
199 responses; Ward 30, 181 responses, Ward 19, 170 responses for a total of 550. The 
profile of respondents from the survey largely matches the 2001 census data on most 
counts, most obviously on race and language. Assuming no changes from 2001, there is a 
slight under-sampling of women in Ward 30 and Ward 19, and possibly an under- 
sampling for informal settlements although 5% in Ward 30 is approximately right. 
What is perhaps most notable from the data on the profile of respondents is the 
relative homogeneity and stability down time of the Ward 19 Imbali population, even 
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when compared to Wards 26 and 30. The latter two wards have had much more 
demographic change, which is probably due to in-migration by black African people. 
 
4. Analysis 
As noted above citizenship is understood in substantive terms as various practices 
citizens engage in with respect to public authority where, in the design of the system as 
encoded in law and policy, public authority in the South African context is taken to mean 
four things: government, political society, civil society and communities or fellow 
citizens, and the relevant practices are understood as (i) what people do in respect of 
the four forms of political authority, (ii) how they feel about political authority, and (iii) 
how they imagine themselves in respect of this political authority. These three practices 
structure the following analysis. 
 
4.1 What citizens do 
4.1.1 Government 
 
Name Wards Political 
Affiliation, 
March 2006 
Socio-economic 
profile 
Vulindlela 1, 2, 7, 8, 9 
3,4,5,6 
IFP 
ANC 
Historically black 
African, rural, 
poorest communities.  
Very little
 business or 
industry 
Edendale and 10, 11, 12, 14, 15,16, ANC Historically black 
Imbali 17,  19,  20,  21,  22, African, urban 
23 townships, working 
class and 
unemployed poor 
communities. Some 
business and 
industry 
Pietermaritzburg 
City Centre 
27, 33, parts of 23 
& 36 
ANC/DA Historically white, 
traditional city 
centre of 
Pietermaritzburg, 
mixed residential 
and business 
Suburbs 18,  24,  25,  26,  37, 
parts of 36 
ANC/DA Historically white 
suburbs  (wealthy 
areas: Montrose 
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   Chase Valley, 
Scottsville, Hayfields, 
Wembley), and 
some business and 
industry 
Woodlands and 
Eastwood 
32, 34 ANC/DA Historically 
coloured area, mostly 
residential, some 
industrial 
The Northern 
Areas 
28, 29, 30, 31, 35 ANC Historically  Indian 
areas, mostly 
residential, some 
business 
Fig. 2. Descriptive overview of Msunduzi by Ward. 
 
In terms of democratic government, the most obvious form of participation is voting. In 
this case some 55% of the sample reported voting in the last national election, which 
appears low given that the percentage poll at the election was 76%, but as McKinley 
points out (2004) only 56% of eligible voters took part in the 2004 election, which places 
our sample almost at the national average. Further, the levels of turnout were roughly the 
same in terms of race, with the exception of White respondents, 65% of whom reported 
using their ballot. In terms of age, the turnout was lowest amongst younger voters, with 
those over 40 years of age recording their preferences at well over 70%. Given the 
proportionally older profile of the White population in our sample, and indeed 
across the country, this will account in part for the higher turnout of White voters. 
 
In terms of the invited spaces of local governance, the most commonly used institution 
is the Community Policing Forum (CPF), but this is probably distorted upwards by 
the relatively high percentage of White respondents (20%) who reported belonging to one 
of these. The responses for other racial groups were around the 10% mark, and indeed this 
was the participation rate reported across the whole sample for School Governing Bodies 
(SGB) and ward committees too. Notably these levels of participation in invited spaces 
are the same if not lower than reported levels of protest for African and Indian 
respondents (14% and 11.6% respectively). In this regard it is remarkable that almost 
no White people reported protesting at all (1.6%). Lastly, in terms of levels of bribery, an 
informal mechanism of engaging government, only a few percent reported bribing 
government officials for a public ser-vice across all races, but over 15% reported having 
bribed a police officer at some point, ranging from 11% for White respondents to 20% for 
Indian respondents. These respondents were mostly those in the 30-50 year age range. 
 
4.1.2 Political and civil society 
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In terms of participation in political society, around one third reported feeling close 
to parties, with the exception of Indian respondents who reported just 10%. 
Participation levels in civil society were higher though, especially in faith-based 
organisations with membership of the whole population at over 50%, with White 
respondents reporting at 62.7%. Attendance at community meetings was around the 
40% mark, with membership of community groups around the  20%  mark,  with 
Indian respondents slightly higher at 25%. Membership of street committees was 
universally low at less than 10%. 
 
Fig. 3 lists these results by race group, in rank order from most to least common 
forms of agency, following the norm set by African respondents, as they constitute the 
majority of respondents in the sample, the city and the country. Those figures which 
differ from the sample norm by more than 10% are highlighted. In addition, the rank 
order and relative weighting of the different components of agency in respect of 
government, political society, civil society and community will tell us something 
about the nature of agency too. 
 
At first glance it does appear that race matters to citizenship in our study. Thus if we 
look at the agency totals in Fig. 3, White South Africans do appear to enjoy higher 
levels of agency than other groups, although interestingly African respondents 
outperform Indian. Notably, though the difference is not massive, with some 15% 
covering the spread, but there is a 10% gap between White respondents in first and 
Africans in second. Further, if we look at the weightings of the various components, 
and identify those that are 10% or greater from the African norm, then it does appear 
that White South Africans are more likely to vote, to participate more in faith-based 
organisations, to attend Community Policing Forums in greater numbers, and not to 
protest. Indians in turn are much less likely to identify with a political party, and 
somewhat more likely to join a community-based organisation. In sum then, there is 
an asymmetry in terms of racial differences, in that White respondents behave 
differently from both African and Indian respondents, who are generally more similar. 
 
This noted we should beware overstating this asymmetrical difference. Thus, if we 
consider the rank order of citizen agency in the sample, then we see that the pattern is 
remarkably similar across races. Taking African respondents as the norm, and 
looking for rank ordering more than two places out it appears that there are two 
differences for White people, who rank CPFs fifth instead of ninth, and protest tenth 
instead of seventh. The rest is much of a mushiness. Similarly, for Indian 
respondents, party identification would be ranked seventh instead of fourth, and 
membership of community organisation fourth instead of sixth. 
 
Further, when one considers that the bulk of citizen agency is captured for all groups in 
the first three categories (voting, FBO membership and community meetings), and that 
these are in the same rank order, then the differences between agency patterns start to 
look less significant. Indeed, if we look at the population as a whole and ask 
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the question, how is it that citizens of our three wards act in respect of 
public authority, it seems fair to conclude that they have more in common than 
not. The citizens of Msunduzi tend to act in respect of public authority in the 
same general ways: firstly, around half vote and join faith-based organisations; 
secondly, around one-third attend community meetings and feel close to political 
parties; thirdly, one- fifth engage in bribery and belong to community 
organisations; and lastly around 10% use protest and invited spaces to try and 
get their way. While there are some racial differences within this larger pattern, 
these differences are asymmetrical and most about White people behaving 
somewhat differently from the norm on a few points. 
 
 White African Indian Sample 
Voted 65.3% 54.9% 46.8% 55.0% 
FBO 63.7% 46.7% 46.5% 51.0% 
Community 
meeting 
33.9% 38.6% 41.2% 38.3% 
Party 34.4% 31.8% 10.4% 26.4% 
Bribery 11.3% 17.8% 19.9% 16.8% 
Community 
organisation 
18.5% 14.1% 22.1% 17.2% 
Protest 1.6% 14.0% 11.6% 10.4% 
SGB 6.5% 8.7% 7.8% 8.0% 
CPF 20.2% 7.8% 9.0% 11.1% 
WC 8.9% 4.3% 8.4% 6.5% 
Total 264.3% 238.7% 223.6% 240.6% 
Ratio 100% 90% 85% 91% 
Fig. 3. What Msunduzi citizens do. The highlighted figures are those that deviate 
more than 10% from the sample norm. 
 
Lastly, w h a t  d o  t h e s e  r e s u l t s  t e l l  u s  a b o u t  p r o t e s t ?  First, w h i l e  t h e r e  
i s  a n  asymmetrical relationship between race and protest in that White people 
do not protest, the difference between Indian and African respondents was small. 
Second, 73% of those who reported protesting also reported attending meetings but 
just some 25% of meeting attendees participated in protest, which suggests that 
protestors are a sub-set of meeting attendees. This is more evidence for the 'brick and 
ballot' model of citizenship.  Further,  the  data  suggests  that  protestors  are  not  
especially  poor, contrary to Alexander's (2010) 'rebellion of the poor' argument. If 
we cross tabulate attending protest with the lack of food and income, as revealed in 
Figs. 4 and 5, then there appears no significant difference between protestors along 
these lines. Van Holdt et al's arguments about the link between protest and 
class-formation mediated through some sense of citizenship are more promising 
explanations of the Msunduzi results. Hence, those who participate in protests 
are not anti-system or anti-government per se. Some 51% of the all protestors 
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also trusted the President. Virtually the same percentage (52%) of meeting 
attendees trust the President, and both figures are practically the same as the 
average for the whole population. More strikingly, of those who attended 
meetings some 68% voted the 2004 national elections, and of those who 
attended protests some 67% voted. This is in contrast to the population average of 
56%. In sum then, protest was not the practice of the politically marginalised 
but the practice of the politically engaged. If this insight is correct, then it 
seems that protest is much more likely to be about the terms of inclusion in 
the system than about outsiders demanding some kind of systemic change. 
While consistent with Holdt's general theory the evidence is too thin to fully 
redeem it. 
 
4.2 What citizens think of authority 
4.2.1 Government 
As regards national government, questions around performance produced 
largely negative responses across the sample, while questions of trust in particular 
offices produced more mixed, and racially variable, responses. Simply put, most 
respondents felt that national government was not doing a particularly good job, 
but Africans felt much more inclined to trust office bearers nonetheless whereas 
Whites felts the converse. Indeed, this pattern was repeated in the responses to 
questions on local government too. 
lack of food 
a
tt
e
n
d
e
d
 p
r
o
te
s
t 
 never once or 
twice 
several 
times 
many 
times 
always don't 
know 
Total 
never 231 26 11 4 2 1 275 
 57,10% 40,60% 35,50% 40% 18% 100% 52,70% 
would 
do if had 
chance 
129 29 14 3 7 0 182 
 31,90% 45,30% 45,20% 30% 63,63% 0 34,90% 
once or 
twice 
16 2 2 1 1 0 22 
 4% 3,10% 6,50% 10% 9% 0 4,20% 
several 
times 
19 6 0 1 0 0 26 
 4,70% 9,40% 0 10% 0 0 5% 
often 5 1 1 0 0 0 7 
 1,20% 1,60% 3,20% 0 0 0 1,30% 
Don't 
know 
5 0 3 1 1 0 10 
 1,20% 0 9,70% 10% 9% 0 1,90% 
 
 Total 405 64 31 10 11 1 522 
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Fig. 4. Cross tabulation of 'attending protest' with 'lack of food'. The highlighted 
boxes are frequent protestors who go without food. 
 
lack of income 
a
tt
e
n
d
 p
r
o
te
s
t 
 neve 
r 
once or 
twice 
several 
times 
many 
times 
always don't 
know 
Total 
never 217 30 17 6 3 2 275 
 59,1% 44,8% 38,6% 19,4% 30,0% 100,0% 52,8% 
would do 
if had 
chance 
115 24 20 19 3 0 181 
 31,3% 35,8% 45,5% 61,3% 30,0% 100,0% 34,7% 
once or 
twice 
12 3 5 1 1 0 22 
 3,3% 4,5% 11,4% 3,2% 10,0% 0,0% 4,2% 
several 
times 
15 5 0 5 1 0 26 
 4,1% 7,5% 0,0% 16,1% 10,0% 0,0% 5,0% 
often 4 1 1 0 1 0 7 
 1,1% 1,5% 2,3% 0,0% 10,0% 0,0% 1,3% 
Don't 
know 
4 4 1 0 1 0 10 
 1,1% 6,0% 2,3% 0,0% 10,0% 0,0% 1,9% 
Total 367 67 44 31 10 2 521 
Fig. 5. Cross tabulation of 'attending protest' with 'lack of income'. The highlighted 
boxes are frequent protestors of low income. 
 
 
 
 
As illustrated by Fig. 6, massive majorities of respondents felt national 
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government's management had performed poorly in respect of the economy, living  
standards (70%+ range), inability to bring prices down (80%), inability to 
reduce inequality (80%), poor performance in fighting crime (80-90%), poor 
performance on health (70-75%), education (60-70%), water (50-63%), food 
(60¬70%), fighting corruption 
(73-86%), HIV-AIDS (65-78%), roads (61-65%), and electricity (48-71%). The 
one 
variable where the sample was positive on government performance was equality for 
women which received a 53% overall, with significant variance between racial 
groups, with White people more impressed at 71%, Africans at 37% and Indian 
respondents at 33%. While there were differences in assessment along racial lines 
the most significant ones have been noted above, and the rest were within a few 
percent. In short, the respondents were remarkably like-minded and parsimonious 
in their assessment of the performance of national government. 
 
Despite this practically identical assessment of performance, respondents 
differed markedly by race when it came to trust in national offices. Fig. 7 illustrates 
that when asked if they trusted the President, 54% of African respondents 
replied in the affirmative compared to just 38% of Indian respondents and 26% 
of White. When asked if they approved of the President, we received almost exactly 
the same scores again (A55%, W36%, I30%). A similar pattern emerged around 
the same question asked of the national assembly, with 50% of Africans trusting 
it, compared to just 33% of Indian and just 17% of White respondents. 
Notably this was the most racialised finding of the survey. Interestingly, as soon 
as the questioning returned to a question related to performance these racialised 
perceptions quickly narrowed. Thus, when asked about corruption in the above 
offices, vast majorities across race said some or more of the President and his 
cabinet were corrupt and even higher levels reported for the national assembly 
and for government officials. On all three measures less than 10% felt that 
there was no corruption in these offices and around 40% across race perceived there 
to be some corruption. 
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Fig. 7. Trust in government office bearers. 
 
In terms of the legitimacy of other national government institutions, there is 
some ambivalence across the sample. Thus while most feel that courts ought to 
have the power to enforce decisions (A72% W79% I62%), trust levels are lower 
across the board (A58%, W69%, I47%). Further, over 50% of respondents regardless 
of race felt that judges are corrupt - a figure higher than that given when asked 
about the police! Similarly around 70% of respondents regardless of race feel that 
police are entitled to enforce the law, half of the sample also say that some police are 
corrupt and 20% feel that most are corrupt. Indeed, when asked whether they 
trust the police, only a majority of 60% of White respondents reported trusting the 
police, whereas only 46% of Africans and 40% of Indians trust the police. 
Significant differences emerged regarding the right of the South African Revenue 
Service (SARS) to raise tax, with those in the affirmative ranging from 85% for 
White respondents, through 52% for African respondents to 42.5% for Indian 
respondents. Lastly, traditional leaders received the lowest positive approval 
ratings around the 30% mark. Thus, trust in institutions needs to be disentangled 
from trust in key office bearers. 
 
This pattern of a common negative perception of government performance  and 
racially divergent attitudes of trust towards office bearers was repeated in the 
responses around local governance too - although one clear difference was substantial 
evidence that many respondents were ignorant of whom their councillor was and 
how they were performing. They were much better informed about national 
politics than local. Thus, in respect of a range of questions about how well local 
government is engaging the public responses  were negative and uniform across 
race. A  clear majority thought  council was doing a poor job making its 
programme known to residents, making its budget known, allowing citizens to 
participate, consulting leaders and handling complaints from the public. Indeed on 
all of these questions, the 'don't know' category was the most common response. 
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On questions of trust in office bearers (Fig. 7), racial differences came through 
more clearly. Thus some 52% of Africans trust the mayor compared to 28% of 
Indian and 20% of White respondents. Approval ratings of the mayor peaked at 57% 
for Africans and 26% for both Indians and Whites. Asked whether the trusted 
the city council, 44% of Africans responded positively, compared to 31% of 
Indians and 27% of Whites. Asked whether they though their councillor was 
doing a good job, 45% of White and Indian responded positively compared to 
just 31% of Africans. On the question of how many of the council was corrupt, 
there were similar levels of suspicion across race with around 45% saying 'some' 
and one-third saying 'most' or 'all'. Racial differences re-emerged on the question 
about the extent to which taxes were used for private rather than public ends by 
the council with those in the firmly negative category topping out at 71% for White 
respondents, 50% for Indian and 44% for African. 
Lastly, on the question of the invited spaces of local government, views did not 
follow a single pattern. Thus whereas the sample generally trusted School Governing 
Bodies with the partial exception of Indian respondents (W58%, A51%, I41%), 
there were quite divergent views on Community Policing Forums with White 
people reflecting high levels of trust (64%), Africans reporting at 40% and Indians 
at just 28%. Views of ward committees were more uniform and tending to the 
negative (I47%, A40%, W40%). 
 
4.2.2 Political and civil society 
Asked whether the trust the ANC, 61% of African respondents responded positively 
compared  to  just  40%  of  Indians  and  11%  of  Whites.  Not  surprisingly,  trust  
in opposition parties was highest for Whites at 55%, followed by 40% of Indians 
and 35% of Africans. Notably, despite this clear racialisation of preferences - at 
least between African and White respondents as Indians are perfectly divided on 
these questions - the majority of respondents do not feel close to any political party 
(W64%, A43%) and 65% of Indians responding 'don't know'. One reading of this 
may be that while citizens vote for parties, most do not feel like participants in these 
parties. Notably, respondents clearly affirmed their belief in political rights across 
the sample. Thus around 80% think South Africans have the right to freedom of 
speech; 90% feel South Africans have freedom of association, and the same 
percentage feel South Africans have a free vote. Nearly 80% feel citizens should 
question leaders, and large majorities felt opposition views should be expressed, 
although Indian respondents were the lowest here at 58% and Whites the highest 
at 92%. Notably, White people (51.6%) were more concerned about media criticism 
hurting the image of the country than Indian (18.2%) or African (25.9%) 
respondents. On the whole though, some democratic political values were widely 
affirmed. The above section has reflected membership levels in faith- based 
organisations and community-based organisations, so this section focuses on the 
question of whether people trust each other. Once again, as with all the questions 
on trust, the answer was racialised such that White respondents  felt  remarkably  
positive  about  their  fellow  citizens  at  64%  in  some contrast to Indian and 
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African respondents at 29% and 28% respectively. 
 
In sum then, respondents share clearly negative impressions of government 
performance at both national and local levels, including corruption, but have 
racially divergent and variable views when it comes to trust from the top offices in 
the land through to their fellow citizens. This pattern breaks down when it 
comes to other government institutions, but there are also some interestingly 
divergent opinions of the efficacy of some invited spaces, with SGBs enjoying some 
legitimacy generally and CPFs enjoying great legitimacy amongst White 
respondents. In many ways this secondary normative pattern around trust and 
parties is widely observed and informs the race and/or party voter loyalty 
understandings of South African politics. Less commonly noted however, is the 
fact that all citizens share very similar assessments of the performance of 
government, and do not feel directly involved in formal invited 
spaces of local governance nor in political parties - with the possible exception of 
a significant minority of African voters. 
 
It could be argued that this is indeed more evidence for the idea of voter loyalty - 
those voters retain their faith in parties despite knowing better - giving credence to 
the idea of South African politics as identity-based around race and/or party. 
This is a powerful point, but makes two assumptions, that voters feel that they 
have a real alternative choice, and that substantive meanings of citizenship are 
largely exhausted by voting, partisan and interest group politics. In respect of 
the former, there are some powerful arguments about whether 'effective' 
opposition parties exist in local areas in South Africa, and especially in Msunduzi 
where one party tends to dominate one geographical area due to the history of 
apartheid and then IFP/ANC violent conflict (Piper, 2000). Although it is now 
possible for parties to enter most areas and campaign, question marks still remain 
over how free local people feel to live and work as opposition party activists in 
these areas. This will be a constraint on capacity to mobilise and organise in an 
area and build up a network of effective local activists who can contest power. 
While this is not the only way electoral politics works - that is, it is theoretically 
possible to win power through media work rather than local organisation - 
the history of politics in the region points to the importance of local institutions 
and networks to securing popular support. 
 
As regards the second assumption, if one adopts a broader conception of citizenship 
as about agency in respect of public authority, and examines the myriad ways 
in which citizens look to secure their Constitutional rights then clearly voting 
and parties is only part of the story. Conceding that race matters to voting is not the 
same as saying that the fundamental patterns of citizenship are primarily 
racialised. Indeed, as noted in the above section, we would suggest that this is 
not the case. Further, the above results confirm the limits of formal institutions of 
local governance and party membership for most citizens, suggesting instead 
reflecting on other informal ways in which they seek to secure their rights. 
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4.3 What citizens think of themselves 
The last element of citizenship considered in this paper concerns citizen's sense of 
their own status and agency. As already noted above most citizens vote, participate in 
some form of civil society formation, and affirm some basic political freedoms, 
suggesting a significant degree of interest in democratic politics. This is confirmed 
by a series of questions which reveal that a majority of African and White 
respondents follow the news on a daily basis, albeit in slightly different ways 
(newspapers: W57%, A49%; TV: W61%, A50%; radio W50%, A41%). The significant 
contrast here is with Indian respondents who reported much lower levels of daily 
news following as follows: newspapers 22%, TV 18%, radio 12%. This asymmetrical 
racial difference was confirmed by reported interest levels in public affairs with 
White and African respondents reporting 72% and 66% respectively, compared to 
Indian respondents at 50%. 
 
Last were questions that probed respondents' explicit sense of agency. In response to 
the question how easy is it to get heard between elections, answers were 
asymmetrically racialised in that 74% of White respondents felt it was difficult to 
be heard compared to 50% of African and 48% of Indian respondents. In response to 
the question about whether ordinary people could improve their circumstances, the 
largest group of respondents felt they could not. Notably again, these responses were 
asymmetrically racialised such that Africans and Whites had similar levels of 
pessimism at 47% and 49% respectively, but were outstripped by the moroseness of 
66% of Indians. 
 
When asked questions about the likelihood that they would make use of 
various courses of action, most across race were disinclined to engage the media 
(10-20%), complain to officials (13¬20%) or write to officials (7-10%). Significant 
differences emerged when asked whether they would engage the ward committee if 
there was a problem, with just 29% of Indian respondents responding positively, 
and double that number at 58% of White respondents answering in the positive. 
Given that they reported similar levels of actually using ward committees, this 
response reflects divergent attitudes rather than practices. Asked whether they 
would join with the community to solve a problem, 60% of African respondents 
replied in the positive with the rest at 20-25%. Given that the levels of 
participation in invited spaces were not significantly different, as noted above, and 
this difference is much higher than the level of protest, this response again 
suggests that attitudinal differences do not translate into differences of practice in 
simple ways. 
 
In sum then, a picture begins to emerge of another racial asymmetry, this time of 
an Indian community somewhat negative in its assessment of citizen power and 
politics more generally, in contrast to both White and African respondents. Perhaps 
the one place where African respondents stand out as different is in their inclination 
to collective action and positive belief in its power to bring change between 
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elections. Similar levels of self-belief were evident among White respondents but 
only in relation to engaging the ward committee, and mostly around election time. 
 
 
5 Conclusion 
From the evidence of the survey in Msunduzi we can conclude that citizenship is 
not racialised in a discrete and consistent sense that different race groups act 
differently, and hold different beliefs about, and see themselves differently in 
respect of, public authority. Instead, we found that respondents tend to act in very 
similar ways across racial lines where around half vote and belong to faith- based 
organisations, around one-third attend community meetings and feel close to 
political parties, one-fifth engage in bribery and belong to community 
organisations, and around one tenth use protest and invited spaces to try and get 
their way. In terms of beliefs, overwhelming majorities endorse political and 
democratic rights, and hold low opinions of the performance of both national and 
local government on the key policy issues of the day. Lastly, while interested in 
politics, most believe that they have a limited capacity to bring about change. 
 
Already it is clear that the racial lens adds nuance to a more basic pattern 
of citizenship in Msunduzi. It does not differentiate the most important from 
least important actions for citizens, or even the rank order of actions aside 
from a few instances for a group here and there. Only when it comes to party 
politics and trust in key political offices, does race come into its own. Otherwise 
when race did matter, it did so asymmetrically, that is, one racial group tended to 
behave differently to the rest of the sample. Thus, in terms of what citizens do, 
White people tend to vote more, belong to faith-based organisations more, use 
Community Policing Forums more and tend not to protest. In terms of 
citizens' attitudes to public authority, African respondents tended to have 
much higher levels of trust of national and local leaders and institutions, and are 
more inclined to turn to collective action. In terms of how citizens feel about 
their own agency, Indian respondents stood out as being disinterested in the 
news and political discussion, and more pessimistic about their capacity to change 
things. 
 
These findings picks up Robinson's (2006b: p. 254) point about how while 
new developments in South African cities may 'entrain the racial division of the 
past; they also gesture towards the emergence of new kinds of social and political 
relations'. It also invites us to explore an intriguing alternative world of local 
politics beyond simple assumptions of race and party. In this regard the findings 
as regards protest are notable. Thus we illustrated that those who protest are not 
any poorer than the sample more generally, suggesting that protest is not simply a 
'rebellion of the poor'. Further, those who protest are more likely to know their 
ward councillor and to vote than the sample as a whole, suggesting that this is 
not the tactic of the political outsider. These findings are consistent with van 
Holdt's suggestion that the protest is caught up with a politics of citizenship 
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around new forms of inclusion and exclusion in local governance which is 
cross-cutting formerly homogenised communities. Notably though, our 
evidence suggests that this is a politics practised by a small minority. 
 
While the current findings can only take us so far, they do gesture at the 
importance of forms of  politics not  linked to liberal conceptions of party 
competition for understanding a changing urban landscape. Urban studies from 
elsewhere in Africa points to the importance of various other forms of practice 
linked to enduring social structures, migration and transient populations, 
network-building under conditions of state weakness and marginality, and the 
intersection of these varying practices with formal institutions and policy 
processes in South Africa in often unpredictable, and spatially complex ways 
(e.g., Ballard et al., 2007). Perhaps more importantly, our findings also affirm 
the importance of new framings of this politics both in Robinson's (2006b) 
sense of transcending restrictive binaries, for example participation versus 
protest or modern versus traditional, but perhaps more importantly, in an 
ontology that takes seriously both the liberal mainstream focus on formal and 
procedurally-defined decision-making spaces and the post-structuralist concern 
for 'the disruptive energies of contestatory spaces' (Barnett, 2008: p. 1643). Indeed 
Barnet's invocation echoes the affirmation in the participatory literature of the 
importance of both the 'invited spaces' of state-sanctioned engagement and the 
'invented' or 'organic' spaces of popular creation, some in oppositional frame 
some not, to understanding power (Cornwall, 2002). Notably, in later versions 
(Cornwall and Coelho, 2007) the simple opposition between formal and informal or 
invited and invented breaks down in light of practices that transform these spaces' 
original character. These are precisely the sensibilities that need to inform future 
work around popular politics in South Africa. 
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